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Irish Language Education and the National Ideal: The Dynamics of Irish 
Nationalism in Northern Ireland. 
 
Since the late 1960s nationalism has been identified as a dominant force in the political 
culture of Northern Ireland and the identification of an Irish nationalism, in particular, has 
been interpreted as the continuation of a historical demand for national independence for the 
entire island (Boyce 1995; English 2006; Phoenix 1994). Recent studies have suggested, 
however, that the ‘Irish Nationalist’ population in Northern Ireland has become increasingly 
content within the new political framework established by the various peace agreements 
negotiated since 1998 and have developed a sense of belonging to the Northern state 
(Hayward, et al., 2014). Any such heightened attachment to Northern Ireland raises important 
questions about the nature of Irish nationalist politics and especially, about how the wider 
population came to relate to the national aspirations of Sinn Féin which has become the 
largest party representing Irish nationalism over the past decade. 
In placing the Northern Ireland situation within the theoretical framework of nationalism, this 
paper will examine the nature of ‘Irish nationalism’ since the 1960s and explore how the 
political ideals espoused by Sinn Féin reflect the priorities of the population they claim to 
represent. To do so the paper will focus on two characteristics often highlighted within 
academic literature as being important in helping to shape and define national identity and 
cohesion; national language and education (Edwards, 2009; Green, 1990; Kamusella, 2012). 
Through an analysis of Irish language study in Northern Ireland’s schools it will be argued 
that it is possible to gain a better understanding of the dynamics that have helped to influence 
modern Irish nationalism. It will be contended that the relationship between nationalist 
ideology and the ‘nationalist community’ is much more complex than is often allowed for 
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and, in particular, that educational inequalities have contributed to an uneven development of 
nationalism within that community.      
The ‘Imagined Community’?: Nations and Nationalism in theory 
There is no disagreement that nationalism has been ‘around’ on the face of the 
globe for, at the very least, two centuries. Long enough, one might think, for it to 
be reliably and generally understood. But it is hard to think of any political 
phenomenon which remains so puzzling and about which there is less analytic 
consensus (Anderson, 2012 [1996]: 1). 
The concept of nationalism has provoked considerable academic debate over the past half 
century but with a particular growth of interest since the 1980s (Anderson, 1991; Billig, 
1995; Gellner, 2006; Smith, 2009). A prominent theme within these discussions centres on 
the factors contributing to the development of nationalist sentiment. In particular, there has 
been much debate as to whether nationalism invents nations (Gellner, 2006; Hobsbawm, 
1992; Anderson, 1991), or whether the existence of a common, ethnic identity, shapes 
nationalism (Armstrong, 1982; Smith, 2009; 2008; Hutchinson, 2005).  
For scholars such as Ernest Gellner (1964; 2006), Benedict Anderson (1991) and Eric 
Hobsbawm (1992), the conditions that enabled the growth of a nationalist vision simply did 
not ‘exist before the advent of modernity’ (Smith, 2008: 3) as the tools necessary to create the 
required sense of shared belonging did not exist (Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 10). The social and 
technological advances associated with modernity provided the conditions to advance 
nationalist thinking and, as such, it was nationalism that created nations rather than the other 
way round (Gellner, 2006: 47; Hobsbawm, 1992: 10). 
This ‘modernist’ analysis has been disputed by prominent scholars such as John Armstrong 
(1982), Anthony D. Smith (Smith, 2009; 2008) and John Hutchinson (Hutchinson, 2005) who 
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argue that the power of nationalism cannot be explained merely by the ‘imaginings’ of an 
elite group of nationalists. Smith (2009) argues that ‘ethnic identities and communities’ are 
crucial elements in ‘the formation and persistence of nations’ (p. 21) and puts forward the 
argument that there is a need to understand the ‘inner world’ of both ‘ethnicity and 
nationalism’ through ‘an analysis of symbolic elements and subjective dimensions’ (p. 23). 
For Smith, the cultural elements of ‘symbol, myth, memory, value, ritual and tradition’ hold 
the key to our understanding better concepts such as ‘ethnicity, nations and nationalisms’ as 
they help to endow a community with a ‘distinctive symbolic repertoire in terms of language, 
religion, customs and institutions’ which helps to differentiate the nation from ‘other 
analogous communities’. A detailed analysis of such, he argues, is crucially lacking from the 
modernist critique which fails to appreciate the important role played by ‘ethnic 
communities’, or ‘ethnies’, in helping to define the nature of nations and nationalism in the 
modern era. These ‘ethnies’ he defines as ‘a named and self-defined human community 
whose members possess a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements 
of common culture, including a link with a territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least 
among the upper strata’ (p. 27).  
For ethno-symbolists it is to these ‘ethnies’ that nationalists turn in order to develop their 
vision of the nation as they provide it with ‘real resonance’ amongst the wider populace 
(Hutchinson, 2005, p. 37). At the same time, however, Hutchinson also recognises that there 
are very often competing interpretations about the past and, as such, there is an element of 
‘imagining’ required, by a nationalist elite, in order to choose those characteristics of the 
nation that engender greatest unity. In his analysis of the growth of Paris as a symbol of the 
French nation, for example, he points out that its status was enhanced by the revolution – in 
spite of the Gironde desire for decentralisation – as a result of an older ethnic tradition that 
had helped to develop a ‘sacred aura’ around the city: 
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The sacred energies associated with kingship were transferred to the republic, for 
which Paris now became the creative centre of modernity and change. Paris was 
the training centre of state elites and Parisian functionaries, like earlier royal 
intendants, were sent to the departments to enforce the revolution in the localities 
(p. 39). 
Whilst the historically important status of Paris was protected in the new France there was 
also a need for some reinvention of the wider national character to reflect the city’s identity – 
thus there was the need to “make” Parisian language and culture the ‘bearers of the national 
civilising project’ (p. 39). That there is the need for processes of ‘revival’ and 
‘redevelopment’ (p. 41) raises important questions as to which elements are then chosen as 
symbols of the modern nation but also how they are then extended to the wider populace 
(Ӧzkirimli, 2008; 2003; see also Hroch, 2000; Wodak, et al., 2009). For the purposes of this 
paper, two key aspects will be analysed in order to explore the processes that have become 
important aspects for discussion within the context of nationalism in Northern Ireland: the 
status of the ‘national language’ and, subsequently, the role of education in the nation 
building process.1  
Making the Nation – Language, Education and a Problematic Ideal 
Since the nineteenth century ‘language’ has come to play a central role in helping to define 
notions of national identity in Europe (Barbour & Carmichael, 2000; Kamusella, 2012). So 
closely tied did language and political identity become, Kamusella (2012) argues, that ‘it is 
impossible to speak in a knowledgeable manner’ about the history of Central Europe ‘without 
recounting the politics of language, which legitimized political and social changes proposed 
by national movements and their nation-states’ (pp. 6-7).  
5 
 
The linkage between language and nation-building emerged during the second half of the 
eighteenth century with German thinkers such as Johann Gottfried von Herder and Johann 
Gottlieb von Fichte identified as being important figures in helping to establish ‘language as 
the essential defining characteristic of a nation’ (Barbour, 2000: 15). That this should be so, 
of course, was not without its difficulties. Billig (1995) points out, when looking at the 
significance of the French Revolution to the historical development of nationalism, that the 
‘language in which the Declaration had been written was only spoken by a minority of the 
population as their first tongue’ and that South of the Loire, ‘it was generally 
incomprehensible’ (p. 25). As such, the nation, and its unifying identity, was ‘a project to be 
attained’ (p. 25) that included a need to ‘impose’ a ‘national language’. This helped to place 
the issue of education on the agenda of those nationalists seeking to ‘revive’ or ‘redevelop’ a 
sense of national identity (Green, 1990). The emergence of systems of national education in 
nineteenth century Europe is viewed as being of great importance to the growth of national 
feeling, with schools seen as a socialising tool capable of inculcating a sense of loyalty to the 
nation amongst the masses (Anderson, 1991; Green, 1990; Hobsbawm, 1992; Reisner, 1922; 
see also Gramsci, 2007).  
Such an analysis, however, tends to ignore the great complexities associated with the growth 
of popular education during the nineteenth century, and, in particular, the often-conflicting 
roles that schools were required to perform (Green, 1990; Hjerm, 2001). Cannadine (2000), 
in his analysis of British society and the role of education, stresses that ‘teaching, learning 
and literacy were intrinsically hierarchical’ and the ‘higher up the social scale, the better, the 
longer and the more expensive the education that was available’ (p. 47).  
Such educational inequalities, with the desire to protect an established social order, had the 
potential to conflict with the emerging nationalist ideal that sought to present ‘the people’ as 
the central component of the nation and as one, unified/homogeneous body (Gellner, 2006; 
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Hroch, 2000). Although key aspects such as a national language could be ‘imposed’, this 
unifying dimension was often weakened by other social and cultural divisions that needed to 
be maintained (Cannadine, 2000; McCann, 1977; Thompson, 2013). This, indeed, was 
reinforced by the varying content of the education deemed appropriate for the differing social 
classes wherein the upper tiers received a classical or professional education whilst the 
priority for the lower orders was largely vocational (Goldstrum, 1977; Green, 1990). This 
inevitably meant that those within the emerging working class communities did not study the 
‘national’ subjects, such as history, to the same extent as their middle and upper class 
counterparts with the consequence being that their sense of ‘national identity’ was often less 
developed. 
The relationship between academic achievement and the inculcation of nationalist sentiment 
in Europe has not been static over the past century. Changing policy priorities across the 
continent since the late 1970s have had a significant impact on education with a much greater 
focus now being placed on both the idea of global citizenship (Keating, 2009) and, more 
specifically, its ‘ensuring economic productivity and competiveness in the context of 
'informational capitalism'’ (Ball, 2008, p. 1). Such new priorities have seemingly contributed 
to a changed dynamic between academic success and nationalist ideology with the latter now, 
increasingly, undermined by the former (Coenders & Scheepers, 2003; Hjerm, 2001). Hjerm 
(2001) explains this by arguing that increased levels of education ‘in some sense prevents 
people from internalising the nationalistic belief system’ (47-8) because they become more 
aware of the ‘imagined’ dimension of nation formation. Whilst this is unquestionably true, it 
needs to be considered within the context that higher education did not have a similar impact 
for previous generations. Rather, the explanation lies with the emergence of a new scholarly 
approach to the study of history that is, in itself, less nationalistic in orientation and 
increasingly willing to challenge established narratives by questioning, not only the origins of 
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the nation, but also the myths and symbols that had helped to define particular ideas of 
national identity (Lawrence, 2005). Developing and promoting such a scholarly approach 
was, however, more difficult in countries where nationalism continued to influence the 
political culture (O'Mahony & Delanty, 2001).                                  
The Development of Irish Nationalism 
The issues and developments analysed above have helped to shape the nature of Irish 
nationalism as it has evolved since the nineteenth century. Barbour (2000) has argued that as 
language became a crucial component of nationalist ideology in Europe it helped to introduce 
a ‘linguistic element into national movements, Irish nationalism being a good case, which had 
previously placed little stress on such questions’ (p. 15). This influence can be seen as early 
as 1843 in the writings of Thomas Davis, a leading figure in the Young Ireland movement, 
who declared that a ‘people without a language of its own is only half a nation’. He further 
contended that each nation should ‘guard its language more than its territories –'tis a surer 
barrier, and more important frontier, than fortress or river’.2 This became an increasingly 
influential political mode of thought during the late nineteenth century with the emergence of 
various groupings espousing a more culturally based nationalism with the language at its 
heart (Billig, 1995; Hutchinson, 1987; McMahon, 2008). The fact that Ireland was seen to 
possess its own distinctive cultural identity, including its own language, was seen to give 
greater legitimacy to claims for nationhood – a nationhood that, increasingly, was deserving 
of political independence (Boyce, 1995; Crowley, 2008). 
The major problem faced by these ‘cultural nationalists’, and those whose political 
nationalism stemmed in part from the cultural arguments, was that Irish language usage had 
experienced a sharp decline during the nineteenth century so that by 1911 the number of Irish 
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speakers stood at 582,446, representing 13.3 per cent of the total population. Perhaps even 
more significantly, only 16,873 of these were Irish monoglots (Crowley, 2008: 158).  
Given the increasingly influential view that the language formed the basis for Ireland’s claim 
to nationality it was vital that action be taken to not only protect Irish but re-establish its 
position as the vernacular of the people – a process that required revivalists to confront the 
commonly held view that the language was ‘backward’ and an obstacle to Ireland’s social 
and economic development (Crowley, 2008). As such, education became a key battle-ground 
in the wider ‘national struggle’ of the period. Organisations such as the Gaelic League were 
established to actively teach the language within communities but also to lobby on its behalf 
for a greater status within the national schools system (Lyons, 1985). These priorities were 
reinforced with the establishment of the new Irish Free State in 1922 as efforts were made to 
develop a sense of Irish national identity that was seen to be in some way akin to that 
espoused by the leaders of the symbolic 1916 Rising and which would help build upon the 
limited political independence secured in the 1921 Treaty (See Collins, 1996; also Lougheed, 
2012; O'Callaghan, 2009).  
Education, therefore, became a central tool in the early efforts to restore Irish as the language 
of the populace (Farren, 1995; Kelly, 2002). For many of the leading revivalists, who either 
continued to exert a considerable influence on government policy or who themselves became 
part of the new post-independence governments, schools were seen as an obvious and quick 
mechanism for ‘Gaelicising’ the young (Brown, 2004; Farren, 1995). That they failed in this 
task has subsequently been blamed on the mistaken nationalist analysis that the national 
schools system, introduced by Britain from the 1830s, had been the primary cause of Irish 
language decline and that a new language education policy could, on its own, undo the 
damage (Crowley, 2008, pp. 165-66). There was a strong agreement within government for 
the views expressed by the influential cultural nationalist Fr. Timothy Corcoran that schools 
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could restore the language ‘even without positive aid from the home’ and a flawed 
assumption that young people would simply start to use the language beyond the classroom 
despite there being little or no social or economic infrastructure to support this (Crowley, 
2008: 166). 
A further important consideration in relation to schooling centres on the nature of the 
educational system itself and how this had the potential to impact, not only the failure of the 
revival project but also the nature of nationalist sentiment in the decades following 
independence. Although the school curriculum was subject to significant reform in the 
decade after independence (Atkinson, 1969; Farren, 1995; O'Callaghan, 2009) little else 
about the system changed. Brown (2004) describes how the ‘twenties saw…very little change 
in the Irish educational system’ which, consequently, meant that it retained: 
…its class-conscious, religiously managed secondary school, its technical sphere 
generally thought socially inferior to the more academic institutions, and its 
universities almost the sole preserve of students from propertied or professional 
backgrounds (p. 39). 
Although the primary schools placed a significant emphasis on the teaching of Irish the 
further a child progressed academically the more they studied the language and, indeed, the 
more important the language became. This was due to the fact that from 1925 a pass in Irish 
at Intermediate level (aged 15-16) was made compulsory for overall academic success and 
also because of legislation that made admission into particular careers in the public services 
dependent on knowledge of the language (Crowley, 2008, pp. 168-71). Importantly, 
progression into intermediate education was, as Crowley (2008) highlights, very much 
reserved to the few with only around 5 five per cent of the age group progressing into 
secondary education during the early 1920s (p. 168). Brown (2004) points out that by the 
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1960s little had changed with a 1962 report entitled Investment in Education, produced by a 
government appointed commission, highlighting a continuing ‘association between class and 
educational advancement’. Moreover, this became ever ‘more marked the higher the age 
group and the higher level’ (Brown, 2004, pp. 237-39).   
Such educational failings suggest that the Irish language – supposedly a primary 
component of the ‘national identity’ – could have become unevenly developed across the 
population dependent on academic achivement. Brown, for example, observes that ‘Gaelic 
enthusiasm’3 was ‘evident among some well-educated adults in the English-speaking areas’ 
and that ‘when broken down by occupations the professional class boasted the largest 
percentage of Irish-speakers – 43.5 percent of this group claiming knowledge of the 
language’ (2004: 51). If particular concepts of Irish national identity, based on the definitions 
of a nationalist elite, are stenghtened by academic progress within a ‘Gaelicised’ educational 
system, it does raise questions concerning how nationalism takes shape in the large sections 
of the population who left school at the age of fourteen.  
Language and Education in Northern Ireland – A Complex Picture 
The idea that educational inequalities can affect the nature of national sentiment is of 
importance when examining the conditions in Northern Ireland that allowed for the outbreak 
of violence often associated with increased nationalist sentiment during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.  
It is necessary to contextualise the violence of the period, and particularly its roots, in 
confrontations arising from a campaign for civil rights that sought equality for the Catholic 
population within the state rather than the more traditional goal of Irish unity (Bew, 2009; 
Arthur & Jeffery, 1988). Indeed, the civil rights campaign has been interpreted by some as 
representing a changed political dynamic in which the growing Catholic middle classes were 
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becoming ever more reconciled to the realities of partition and more aware of the potential 
for socio-economic progression (Cochrane, 1999, pp. 18-22). This, it has been suggested, 
stemmed from a rising ambition within northern Catholics as the legacy of the 1947 
Education Reform Act (NI) became manifest (Staunton, 2001). This Act had introduced the 
provision of free compulsory education up until the age of 15, the raising of funding for 
Catholic maintained schools to 65% and the making available of grants for study at 
university.  The first beneficiaries of these reforms emerged during the 1950s and 1960s with 
a desire to progress the social ladder, thus potentially undermining traditional nationalist 
politics (Arthur, 1974; Arthur & Jeffery, 1988; Farren, 1995).  
The reality, however, was more complex. There is little doubt that ambitions within the new, 
university-educated generation rose considerably but this did not necessarily mean an 
immediate weakening of traditional nationalist loyalties. Rather, it helped to create a measure 
of conflict between the two as the young people struggled with a continued attachment to the 
nationalist ideal of Irish unity and a desire to advance the social ladder. The nature of this 
conflict is evident in an Irish Times piece written by John Hume in 1964 describing the new 
scenario: 
The crux of the matter for the younger generation is the continued existence, 
particularly among the Catholic community, of great social problems of housing, 
unemployment and emigration. It is the struggle for priority in their minds 
between such problems and the ideal of an United Ireland with which they have 
been bred that had produced the frustration...It may be that the present generation 
of younger Catholics in the North are more materialistic than their fathers but 
there is little doubt that their thinking is principally geared towards the solution of 
social and economic problems. This had led to a deep questioning of traditional 
Nationalist attitudes.4  
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Figure 1: No. of students studying 'O' Level Irish, 1957-72
Although there was this ‘questioning of traditional Nationalist attitudes’ it was not something 
that could be easily cast aside. As Hume acknowledges, young people continued to be 
brought up believing in the ‘ideal of an United Ireland’. Importantly, this was not just a 
political socialisation established in the home. There is evidence to suggest that those young 
people attending Catholic grammar schools, in particular, continued to gain a ‘nationally’ 
based education that, like schools in the South, placed an emphasis on a study of the Irish 
language, Irish history and the playing of Gaelic games (McGrath, 2000). This had been a 
characteristic of Catholic education in Northern Ireland since partition and was often a source 
of tension between the managers of the Catholic schools and the Stormont government during 
the 1950s (McGrath, 2000; Farren, 1995). The impact of this, as we enter the era of the civil 
rights movement when nationalist sentiment within the Catholic community was supposed to 
be waning, can be seen from the number of students studying the Irish language at ‘O’ Level5 
which shows a 
considerable rise 
from 667 students 
in 1957 to 2,131 by 
1972 (Figure 1). 
Accounts from the 
period help to 
contextualise this growth and also, crucially, highlight some of the political connotations 
attached to it. In an account of her educational experiences during the 1950s, Bernadette 
Devlin (1969), who would later become a civil rights campaigner and Member of Parliament, 
describes her grammar school as being ‘a militantly Republican school’ and puts this down to 
the vice-principal, for whom: 
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…everything English was bad. She hated the English – and with good 
reason...Everything we did in school was Irish-orientated. She was a fanatic about 
Irish culture... (pp. 61-2). 
The Irish language formed an important part of this fanaticism as Devlin highlights: 
I knew no Irish when I went to Grammar school, but the class I joined was a class 
of crude political rebels: we knew nothing about politics except what we were for 
and against, and we were for Ireland and Mother Benignus was our heroine. In 
addition to our passion for Ireland we had a very good teacher of Gaelic, with an 
enthusiastic approach to the subject, so that by the end of my first year the whole 
class was way above the standard of Irish-speaking expected of eleven-year-olds 
(p. 63). 
That the school was seen to develop political thinking and link this to the cultural 
subjects being studied highlights the extent to which some schools were still very much 
responsible for promulgating a traditional nationalist sentiment (McGrath, 2000). It is 
important to recognise, however, that this political socialisation was not spread evenly across 
the Catholic community. In the first instance, there remained a significant problem when it 
came to the provision of secondary education for the Catholic population with McGrath 
(2000) pointing out that by 1957/58 it was still the case that ‘the overwhelming majority of 
Northern Ireland’s voluntary primary school graduates were not enjoying a secondary 
education’ (p. 144).6 He further notes that by the end of the 1950s a ‘Protestant primary 
school graduate was twice as likely as his or her Catholic counterpart to be attending a 
secondary school’ (p. 144). 
This lack of educational provision was not the only factor determining inequality when it 
came to the dissemination of nationalistic beliefs in schools. A second, and perhaps more 
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important cause in the longer-term, was the nature of the schooling itself. This centred on the 
fact that the form of cultural education, highlighted above, was much stronger in Catholic 
Grammar Schools than it was in Catholic Secondary Schools where the emphasis tended to 
be more vocationally driven. As a consequence of this the more academic, and crucially, 
‘national’ subjects, tended to be given a lesser status. This was certainly the case when it 
came to studying the Irish language. Data for the 1970s, although showing a rise in the 
number of young people studying the language at Certificate of Secondary Education level, 
reinforces the fact that it was, primarily, a subject studied at the more academic ‘O’ Level 
offered in the Grammar Schools (Table 1). 
It must be acknowledged that 
these statistics do not present a 
complete picture as there will 
inevitably be some crossover 
between the Secondary and 
Grammar schools. Moreover, the 
Secondary schools would have 
provided classes in Irish that were not necessarily translated into young people taking exams. 
Nevertheless, they do give some indication of the stark differences between the two sectors 
when it comes to the higher level study of Irish. This is very much reflected in the views 
expressed by some of those who came through the educational system and joined the ranks of 
the (re)emerging Irish Republican Army (IRA) during the late 1960s and early 1970s. One 
former IRA prisoner recalled how: 
The Irish language used to be taught in the citadels – it would have been St 
Malachy’s, St Mary’s, the Cluain Ard, the Ard Scoill, you know, that’s where the 
Table 1: Number of students studying ‘O’ Level and CSE Irish 
language, 1973-78 
Year GCE ‘O’ Level 
Certificate for 
Secondary Education 
1973 1949 51 
1974 1702 87 
1975 1783 135 
1976 1743 201 
1977 1754 163 
1978 1753 123 
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Irish language was; and the Irish language would not have been in working-class 
areas bar the former IRA prisoners homes from the 1940s.7 
Language, Nationalism and the Working Class 
That there was some level of detachment between the working-class Catholic community and 
the important cultural dimensions of Irish nationalism implies that notions of ‘Irishness’ 
remained unevenly spread and that nationalism often manifested itself in different ways. This 
has considerable implications for how we should interpret the nature of the Northern Ireland 
conflict and how it developed. This centres largely on the fact that when the IRA re-emerged 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s it was young people from the working class areas – 
often those most likely not to have studied ‘national’ subjects such as Irish or Irish history – 
that swelled its ranks (English, 2004; Taylor, 1998). As such, the traditional ideology of Irish 
nationalism and republicanism was not necessarily a driving motivation for new recruits of 
the movement but rather a communal sense of victimhood and wider feelings of hostility to 
the Unionist administration in Stormont shaped their political views. This can be seen from 
the comments of one IRA ex-prisoner who reflected that in the early years of the conflict the 
aspiration of the republican movement remained simple: ‘Brits out of Ireland...that was the 
core of it’.8 Republican leaders recognised from an early stage, however, that this needed to 
change and that republicans, particularly active republicans, needed to be more aware of their 
wider social, political and cultural aspirations. The primary mechanism for bringing this 
about was through a significant programme of internal debates, discussions and classes held 
in the prisons from  the 1970s. These debates, organised by the more politically minded 
figures, aimed to advance the political dimension of the republican struggle:  
Now internally within republicanism you have had a debate which has been going 
on from that [Brits out] where it goes to socialism as one of the component parts: 
does nationalism come before it...or are they hand in hand?9   
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One consequence of these educational activities was a return to the type of national ideals 
espoused during the 1916-21 period. Northern republicans became increasingly vocal in their 
criticism of the Southern state and claimed that parties such as Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael had 
abandoned the true principles of 1916. Arguing against the prominent status afforded to the 
Catholic Church in Southern politics and the willingness of political leaders to condemn IRA 
activities in the North, republican leaders claimed that the ‘Free State’ had wholly abandoned 
the ideals of historic figures such as Patrick Pearse and James Connolly whose spirit now 
lived on only in the emerging Provisional IRA (Adams, 1994; English, 2004). Such political 
arguments were seen, by republicans, to give greater legitimacy to the resurgent militarism 
that was based on the narrative of a historic ‘armed struggle’ that would bring independence 
to the island. The young men and women ‘volunteers’ swelling the ranks of the republican 
movement were, therefore, merely the latest in a long line willing to fight for Ireland (Adams, 
1994).  
As the political dimension increased in importance, so too did the status of the Irish 
language. The language, again, came to be seen as an important symbol of Irishness, and a 
further component of the historic republican struggle that had been abandoned by the 
southern state (Adams, 1994; O'Reilly, 1999). Within the republican wings of the Maze 
prison the language became both a tool against the prison regime but also, increasingly, an 
important link to previous nationalist campaigns. Irish language classes, taught by those 
prisoners with a knowledge of the language, became so common amongst Republican 
prisoners that the prisons themselves became known as a ‘Jailtacht’ (MacIonnrachtaigh, 
2013).10  
Upon their release from prison many republicans played a significant role in giving the 
language a more prominent status within what was seen as a wider political struggle against 
the effects of British colonialism on the island (Howe, 2000; O'Reilly, 1999; 1997). A Sinn 
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Féin poster from the mid-1980s, for example, urged the populace to ‘RESIST BRITISH 
RULE: LEARN IRISH’11. It was also to the fore in a party publication, Learning Irish: A 
Discussion and Information Booklet (1985), which declared that: 
Sinn Féin is pledged to resisting not only economic and political oppression but 
also the cultural and social controls imposed by the British and their allies on the 
Irish people (Sinn Féin, 1985, p. 2). 
Furthermore, it stressed that: 
...it is our contention that each individual who masters the learning of the Irish 
language has made an important personal contribution towards the reconquest of 
Ireland (Ibid). 
This was reiterated the following year in a further publication entitled The Role of the 
Language in Ireland's Cultural Revival (1986), which sought to emphasise the importance of 
Irish to the wider ‘struggle’ and its role in fighting a wider Anglo-American ‘Coca-Cola 
culture’. One contributor, Pádraig Ó Maolcraoibhe, stated his belief that: 
In the six north-eastern counties of Ireland under British rule, nationalists are 
taking a greater interest in the Irish language revival than ever before. None can 
dispute the fact that this is connected with the political and military struggle that 
has been going on since the late sixties, which has heightened national 
consciousness among Northern Nationalists (1986, p. 7). 
This was an aspect of the wider republican agenda that Gerry Adams, a leading figure within 
Sinn Féin throughout much of the period, was particularly keen to emphasise in his writings 
and policy statements (Feeney, 2002). In his 1994 book, Free Ireland: Towards a Lasting 
Peace, which sought to give a political context to the IRA violence of the previous twenty-
five years, he maintained that: 
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The revival of the Irish language as the badge of identity, as a component part of 
our culture and as the filter through which it is expressed, is a central aspect of 
the reconquest (Adams, 1994, p. 121).     
To develop these ideals republicans worked to establish community based Irish language 
classes and Irish-medium schools that were kept very much separate from both the 
mainstream education system and the Catholic church.12 The language became ever more 
evident in nationalist, working-class, areas and in West Belfast the language became so 
prominent that it led to the formation of a ‘Gaeltacht Quarter’. All of this helped to generate a 
large degree of optimism that progress was being made in the wider ‘struggle’ as can be seen 
in the writings of Ó Maolcraoibhe (Sinn Féin, 1986): 
In the Irish schools in the North, working-class kids predominate for their parents 
were radical enough to break out of the system. The children are being given a 
direct link with the culture of their ancestors. They will grow up to lead a lot of 
their lives through Irish and they will not feel the alienation of Irish people with 
only the language imposed on them by imperialism in their mouths (p. 8). 
It is important to note, however, that despite the heightened nationalist sentiment generated 
by the conflict and the wider political manoeuvrings on issues such as the Irish language, 
evidence would suggest that such a reawakening remained limited. 
Irish Language Education – A Limited Revival? 
There can be little doubt that the political climate in Northern Ireland during the years of 
conflict helped to generate a greater degree of national consciousness within the Catholic 
community and, perhaps more specifically, within sections of the Catholic working class 
population who had been mobilised by political leaders from within their own areas. How 
this raised national consciousness then manifested itself needs greater analysis however. In 
particular, there is a need to consider the challenge presented by Eric Hobsbawm (1992) to 
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examine how the ‘official ideologies’ of nationalist movements come to be reflected in the 
communities that they claim to represent (p. 11). Having established the prominent place 
afforded to the Irish language within the ‘official ideology’ of Sinn Féin, for example, we 
would expect to see usage of the language increase significantly, particularly as the party 
increased its electoral standing throughout the 1990s and 2000s. An examination of 
educational statistics, however, presents a more complex picture that raises important 
questions concerning how a ‘nationalist’ community relates to the ideals of a nationalist 
movement in a modern, western democratic society. 
As highlighted earlier there was a significant rise in the number of young people – 
predominantly Catholics – studying the Irish language at ‘O’ Level between 1957 and 1972, 
when the figure reached 2,131 entrants. In the decade after 1972, despite the heightened 
political consciousness generated by the conflict and the prominent ideological status 
afforded to the language, there was a decline in the number of young people choosing to 
study Irish so that by 1982 there were 1,658 entrants: a fall of 473 from the 1972 figure. 
Perhaps even more significantly this decline was taking place within the context of a rising 
school population. Statistics provided by Sweeney (1988) for the period 1972-1986 (Table 2) 
demonstrate the 
extent to which 
Irish remained 
little more than a 
minority subject 
and how, as a 
proportion of the total number of students, its study had fallen quite significantly. 
It is important to point out that the numbers studying Irish were actually larger than these 
statistics would suggest given that the language was still a compulsory subject for the first 
 1972 1977 1982 1986 
Numbers studying Irish 2,131 1,917 1,658 1,529 
Total number of 15 yr. old 
students in secondary 
education 
16,735 25,678 27,717 27,734 
Proportion of students 
studying Irish 
12.7% 7.5% 5.98% 5.5% 
Table 2: Number of students studying ‘O’ Level/GCSE Irish, 1972-1986 
 (Source: Sweeney, 1988) 
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three years of study within many Catholic secondary and grammar schools (McGrath, 2000). 
The actual numbers studying Irish at this lower level are difficult to identify but Prichard 
(1982) has suggested that the number was potentially as high as twenty-five thousand whilst 
Ó hAdhmaill (1989) has argued that in 1986 the figure stood at twenty thousand. What is 
important about the ‘O’ Level/GCSE statistics presented above is that they provide data on 
the numbers choosing to study the language once the period of compulsion had ended. As 
such, they show that the vast majority of students stopped studying it as soon as this option 
became available, irrespective of its perceived symbolism – a symbolism often highlighted 
within the schools themselves (Kelly, 2002; McGrath, 2000).  
Politically, the late 1980s and early 1990s represented a period of transition within Northern 
Ireland when various exploratory talks began about the potential for developing a peace 
process (Bew, 2009; Mallie & McKittrick, 2002; Taylor, 1998). Although the IRA continued 
its armed campaign, we see a shifting narrative emerging within the Sinn Féin leadership that 
spoke of the potential for peace and a political strategy capable of furthering republican 
aspirations (Adams, 1994; Sinn Féin, 1987). The Irish language became a crucial component 
of this strategy and it came to act as an alternative ethno-symbol to the militarism that had 
largely dominated republicanism since the 1970s. Its importance was reflected in the status 
Sinn Féin afforded to it during the peace talks of the late 1990s when the party secured a 
British government commitment to ‘take resolute action’ for its promotion (HMSO, 1998).  
This heightened political status and symbolism were contributing factors in helping to 
increase the numbers of young people studying the language at the new GCSE level. 
Numbers rose from 1,650 in 1989 to 2,021 by the 1995/96 academic year and this rise 
continued until 2002/03 when numbers peaked at 2,689 GCSE entrants. One of the important 
characteristics of this growth is that, unlike the growth of the1960s, it centred predominantly 
21 
 
on Catholic secondary schools. Indeed, during the early years of the new century, such was 
the growth within the secondary sector that it was putting more young people through GCSE  
Irish than the Catholic Grammar schools (Table 3).   
Although no single element can help 
to explain this growth, it is important 
to contextualise it within the rapid 
expansion of the Irish-medium 
primary education sector that had been 
actively promoted by republicans since the early 1980s. Throughout the 1990s the numbers 
attending such schools had increased rapidly from 675 in 1993 to 1,115 students in 1999. By 
the 2006/07 academic year the figure was over two thousand. 
These rising numbers of young people educated primarily through the medium of Irish until 
the age of eleven greatly affected the secondary/non-grammar sector. There was now an onus 
on secondary schools to increase access to the language in a way that had not been prioritised 
previously. Moreover, given the level of Irish already acquired in these primary schools the 
obvious scenario was that students would be well placed to complete a GCSE in the 
language.  
The overall rise in the numbers of young people studying Irish during this period, particularly 
those from working class communities, corresponds to the political emphasis placed on the 
language by Sinn Féin as it became the biggest nationalist party in Northern Ireland (Adams, 
2005; Bew, 2009). The great challenge faced by the party – and all those seeking to promote 
the language – was maintaining this momentum as the peace process became more deeply 
embedded, and as a measure of political ‘normality’ came to prevail. With the creation of a 
more stable, peaceful, society there was a very real danger that the priorities of the population 
could, eventually, be directed away from the ‘national question’ towards issues around 
Table 3: Numbers studying GCSE Irish in Grammar and Non-
Grammar Schools 
 Grammar Non-Grammar 
2000 1,144 1,308 
2001 1,226 1,444 
2002 1,264 1,425 
2003 1,210 1,320 
2004 1,060 1,188 
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individual progress and social mobility (Breen, 2000). Indeed, there is growing evidence to 
suggest that this process is underway, with the constitutional question becoming less 
important and the ‘Nationalist’ community becoming increasingly satisfied with the new 
political dispensation (Hayward, et al., 2014). Findings from the longitudinal ‘Northern 
Ireland Life and Times Survey’, for example, have shown a decline in support for Irish Unity 
within the Catholic 
population between 1998 
and 2010 despite the 
growing political support 
for Sinn Féin during that 
same period (Figure 2).   
Data from the survey also 
suggests that, although 
‘Nationalist’ continues to be the preferred political label, there is a growing number of people 
within the Catholic population that now consider themselves neither ‘Nationalist’ or 
‘Unionist’ (Figure 3). 
The nature of this ‘normalisation’ can also be assessed by examining how it has affected the 
study of the Irish language 
at GCSE level. Whilst 
numbers had increased as 
the political climate 
underwent significant 
change during the 1990s 
and early 2000s, this has 
altered dramatically over the past decade. From a peak of 2,689 students in the 2002 
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academic year, the numbers had fallen to 2,248 by the 2004 term and, despite a temporary 
rise in 2006 (2,446 students), by the 2011 term the figure sat at just 1,572 students. One of the 
most important features of this decline is that it has been almost exclusively within the 
Catholic secondary school sector (Figure 4). By the 2008 school year, only 661 students were 
studying GCSE Irish 
within the non-grammar 
sector. This decline is 
explained, in part, by a 
significant broadening of 
the curriculum since 2007, 
allowing for a much wider 
choice of subjects at GCSE level. It has been suggested that this, alongside the increased 
pressure on schools to achieve better GCSE results, has made the language less attractive for 
both students and schools, as one teacher explained:  
I think they (schools) are shirking their responsibilities. Personally, I think 
that…it (Irish) is seen as a difficult option, and we are currently motivated by the 
results of league tables and if your subject produces results which aren’t as 
positive then another subject is brought in which produces better results.13 
This statement points to important changes that have taken place within the Catholic 
education system since the 1990s. In the first instance, there has been improved relations 
between the Catholic sector and the Westminster government so that the schools themselves 
feel better treated within the system and state (Osborne, et al., 1993). Furthermore, in line 
with the educational agenda pursued by Westminster governments since the 1980s 
(Tomlinson, 2005), the focus of the schools has shifted to meeting the demands for improved 
educational standards to aid economic priorities. These changes have, in the main, been 
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welcomed, and reflect rising ambitions within large sections of the Catholic/Nationalist 
population as new job opportunities became available (Breen, 2000). Of the 534 Catholics 
that contributed to the Young Life and Times survey14 in 2013, for example, 59 per cent 
believed they would be ‘Going to college or university full time’ in October 2015 whilst a 
further 31 per cent believed they would be ‘At college or university and working part time’. 
That 90 per cent of the sixteen-year-old Catholics surveyed aspire to further their study gives 
an indication of the type of ambition for social and economic progress that seems to exist 
within large sections of that community which, potentially, could have implications for Irish 
nationalism in the years ahead.               
Conclusion 
Since the late 1960s nationalism has been identified as a dominant force in the political 
culture of Northern Ireland (English, 2006). This has taken on many of the characteristics of 
previous nationalist movements in Ireland including the cultural nationalism that 
characterised the early twentieth century and which sought, primarily, to protect and promote 
the Irish language as the national language (Crowley, 2008; Hutchinson, 1987; McMahon, 
2008).  
In placing the Northern Ireland situation within the theoretical framework of nationalism 
however, particularly the ethno-symbolist interpretation, this paper has argued that the 
relationship between the wider ‘national’ population and the cultural ideals of ‘nationalist’ 
leaders is hugely complex. Whilst political support for nationalist parties, particularly Sinn 
Féin, has increased since the 1990s, this has not led to a dramatic Irish language revival. 
Indeed, the party’s significant efforts to promote its usage have achieved only limited 
success.    
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Historically this failure has been caused, in part, by educational inequalities that have ensured 
notions of national identity became unevenly spread, with those gaining a more ‘academic’ 
education increasingly likely to have studied, at a higher level, those subjects deemed 
‘national’. That notions of national identity vary, based on educational attainment (and thus 
social class), has ensured that nationalism manifests itself in different ways across the 
population with certain ethno-symbols coming to mean more to a select few than they do to 
the wider population.  
Finally, however, it has also been argued that recent educational reforms, concentrating on 
broader educational standards, have undermined the socialising dimension of schools when it 
comes to the politics of Irish nationalism. Consequently, the symbolism of the Irish language, 
even to those within more academic institutions, may further decline in the years ahead, 
reflecting the patterns of the Irish Republic since independence in 1922.  
  
                                                 
Notes 
1 I have chosen to look at language ahead of other ‘ethno-symbols’ primarily because it has been such an 
important theme in the history of modern Irish nationalism. The importance of other symbols tend to fall and 
rise in significance but the symbolism of Irish remains relatively consistent (Crowley, 2008). 
 
2 Thomas Davis, ‘Language and Nation’ in The Nation, 1 April 1843 
3 The term Gaelic was previously the official term when referring to Irish. Today, the latter tends to be favoured. 
4 John Hume ‘The Northern Catholic I’ printed in the Irish Times 18 May 1964 
5 Academic examination taken at the age of sixteen.  
6 Voluntary sector in Northern Ireland are predominantly schools run by or under the auspices of the Catholic 
Church who wanted to ensure maximum control of the educational provision afforded to Catholics. 
Compromises with the Unionist government meant that by the 1950s the government was meeting 65 per cent of 
capital and general costs but the remaining 35 per cent continued to be a significant problem for the schools.  
7 Interview with the author 12/12/2011  
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8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
10 ‘Jailtacht’ is a play on the Irish word Gaeltacht that describes an area in which Irish is the primary language of 
the people. 
 
11 Linenhall Library Posters Collection, PPO 0191 
12 These efforts often generated opposition from other Irish language groups who claimed that Sinn Féin were 
politicising the language. There was also some opposition from the Catholic Church towards the Irish language 
schools as they were in competition with Church run schools. 
  
13 Irish language teacher based in West Belfast. Interview with author 16/05/2011  
14 Participants, since 2003, have been 16 years of age.  
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